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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, as Trustees of a group insurance plan, 
filed this action interpleading a $10,075.55 fund which was 
created through refunds and dividends from insurance premium 
payments by both Defendants. During the time the fund accu-
mulated, Defendant-Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc., paid 
$89,729.27 (92.2%) of the premiums and Defendant-Appellant, 
J. E. Crofts & Sons, paid $7,571.31 (7.8%) of the premium 
payments which were made to the Trustees on account of the 
respective employees of each Defendant. Later, Defendant-
Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc., terminated its partici-
pation in the insurance plan and requested distribution of 
a pro-rata share of the fund. Defendant-Appellant, J. E. 
Crofts & Sons, objected making claim to the entire fund, and 
Plaintiff Trustees asked the Court to determine proper distri-
bution. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Both Defendants filed Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The Court adopted the theory of a constructive trust awarding 
Defendant-Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc., 92.2% of the 
fund ($9,289.66) and awarding Defendant-Appellant, J. E. 
Crofts & Sons, 7.8% of the fund ($785.89). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc., 
seeks affirmance of the proportionate awards to each Defen-
dant allocable to their participation in the fund. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For many years, the Trustees of the Utah Automobile 
Dealers Association Group Insurance Plan, Plaintiff herein, 
have operated an insurance brokerage providing group insurance 
plans for the use and benefit of employees of its members and 
subscribers. Prior to December, 1964, the Plaintiff Trustees 
maintained certain trust reserve accounts and equity accounts 
under the name of "Pearson & Crofts". One of said accounts 
designated as Pearsons No. 2 resulted from payment of group 
insurance premiums on employees at a sawmill and logging 
operation located at Panguitch, Utah, operated jointly by the 
Pearson family and the Crofts family. (R. 44, 56) On December 
30, 1963, this business entity was incorporated as "Crofts-
Pearson Industries". Alfred H. Crofts, Leo H. Crofts, John 
M. Crofts and Jay H. Crofts each owned 1,500 shares of stock 
and the Pearsons owned an equal number of shares therein. 
(R. 123) The corporate Defendant, J. E. Crofts & Sons, was 
not at any time an owner of or shareholder in the corporation, 
Croft-Pearson Industries. The name of the corporation, 
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Crofts-Pearson Industries, Inc., was changed to Kaibab-Crofts 
Industries by an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation 
on August 26, 1965. The name of the corporation, Kaibab-
Crofts Industries, was changed to Kaibab Industries pursuant 
to Articles and Certificate of Consolidation on October 16, 
1968. By virtue of the issuance of said Certificates, 
Kaibab Industries is the successor in interest of Crofts-
Pearson Industries, Inc. (R. 88, 123) 
From and after July, 1965, the sawmill and logging 
employees at Panguitch were on the payroll, employees of and 
employed by Kaibab Industries and its predecessors and were 
not at any time after said date on the payroll, employees of 
or employed by J. E. Crofts & Sons, a corporation, or its 
individual shareholders. Each and all of the group insurance 
premium payments for said employees were made by and charged 
to the bank accounts of Kaibab-Crofts Industries and Kaibab 
Industries. During the same period, J. E. Crofts & Sons 
made similar premium payments in behalf of a few persons 
which it employed. (R. 87, 88) 
The Trustees' equity account, Pearsons No. 2, 
pertaining to the employees of the Panguitch business entity 
continued under that designation until March of 1967, at which 
time the respective interests of the Pearsons and the Crofts 
therein were resolved by agreement. Thereafter, although 
Kaibab Industries was already participating in the fund, the 
-4-
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Trustees designated the account J. E. Crofts & Sons. (R. 
44-45, 56-58) During this period of time, 1965, 1966, and 
early 1967, the Panguitch company, Kaibab and its predeces-
sors, was receiving and paying separate monthly statements 
from the Trustees. From March, 1967, to September, 1968, 
Kaibab received statements under the designation J. E. 
Crofts & Sons. From September, 1968, to February, 1969, 
when Kaibab Industries terminated its participation in the 
fund, billings were received under the designation of 
Kaibab Industries. (R. 35-37, 42-46) 
Following the settlement with Pearsons in March, 
1967, it was determined that J. E. Crofts & Sons1 balance 
in the equity account as of April 30, 1964, was $4,863.83. 
However, the Trustees paid dividends to J. E. Crofts & Sons 
in 1966 and 1967 totalling $4,851.72, an amount almost 
identical to the original equity account balance. (Letter 
Exhibit.) As a result, the interpleaded equity account 
balance of $10,087.66 has been virtually all generated by 
the group insurance premiums made by each of the Defendants 
on account of their respective employees during the period 
May 1, 1965, to April 30, 1969. 
Exhibit No. 6 (R. 90-91) is a document of account 
itemizing Kaibab Industries' premium payments to the Plaintiff 
Trustees. In calendar 1965, Kaibab made five premium payments 
directly to Trustees totalling $9,635.25. During the calendar 
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years 1966, 1967 and part of 1968, Kaibab remitted 35 
premium payments to the Trustees via J. E. Crofts & Sons 
totalling $69,527.77 and from September, 1968, to February, 
1969, Kaibab remitted payments directly to the Trustees 
totalling $10,566.25. During this same period, J. E. Crofts 
& Sons paid $7,571.31 of premiums. After deducting the 
original equity account balance, the combined premiums 
generated total funds of $10,075.55. (R. 90-91, Letter 
Exhibit) 
In soliciting Kaibab Industries1 insurance business, 
billing for and collecting premiums, and insuring its employees, 
both the Trustees and J. E. Crofts & Sons invited, sanctioned 
and ratified Kaibab Industries as a participant in the Group 
Insurance Plan. (Trust Agreement Exhibit, Article III, §2; 
Article V, §2) When Kaibab Industries terminated its parti-
cipation in the plan and requested a pro rata share of the 
equity account trust fund, J. E. Crofts & Sons objected and 
claimed the entire fund. The Trustees then took the position 
that it was up to the participants to agree on a division of 
the fund before distribution would be made. (R. 46, 58) The 
participants could not agree and the Trustees interpleaded 
the fund. 
Hereafter, the Defendant-Appellant, J. E. Crofts & 
Sons,will be referred to as "J. E. CROFTS" and the Defendant-
Respondent, Kaibab Industries, will be referred to as "KAIBAB". 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT CREATING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND 
AWARDING A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE INTERPLEADED FUND TO 
EACH PARTY WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Should equity and good conscience permit J. E. Crofts 
to take the entire trust fund or should it and Kaibab each 
receive a proportionate share to prevent unjustice and unjust 
enrichment? 
In response to that query, a brief comparison of the 
insurance fund activities of each firm during the 1965-1969 time 
frame draws the main issue into sharp focus. During this period, 
J. E. Crofts, although not an insurance broker, solicited, 
collected and remitted to the Trustees 35 insurance premium 
payments by Kaibab totalling $69,527.77. (R. 90-91) In the 
same period J. E. Crofts made similar premium payments totalling 
only $7,571.31. In 1966-1967, J. E. Crofts received and retained 
dividends amounting to $4,871.52. (Letter Exhibit) Based on 
this activity and its status as a member of the Automobile 
Dealers Association, it claims the whole trust fund balance 
of $10,075.55. Kaibab in 1965 paid $9,635.25 directly to the 
Trustees in 5 premium payments. Then from 1966 into 1968 paid 
$69,527.77 via J. E. Crofts. In 1968-1969, Kaibab received 
and paid direct billings amounting to $10,566.25. Total 
premium payments by Kaibab $89,729.27. (R. 90-91) Of all 
premium payments in relation to the trust account Kaibab paid 
92.2% and J. E. Crofts paid the balance of 7.8%. 
-7-
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In view of these facts, the lower court's findings 
and judgment (R. 134) adopting a constructive trust for the 
fund, are like the sower's seeds which fell upon good ground, 
that is, the prevention of unjust enrichment. In Corpus 
Juris Secundum, Trusts, the basis and elements of constructive 
trusts are described: 
"A constructive trust is a creature of equity, 
defined supra §15 as a remedial device by which 
the holder of legal title is held to be a trustee 
for the benefit of another, who in good conscience 
is entitled to the beneficial interest... A 
constructive trust lacks the attributes of a true 
trust, that is, it has none of the elements of 
an express trust and is not a fiduciary relation-
ship, but it is a fiction imposed as an equitable 
device for achieving justice." 89 CJS Trusts §139, 
p. 1015. 
"Generally, any transaction may be the basis for 
creating a constructive trust where for any 
reason Defendant holds funds which in equity 
and good conscience should be possessed by 
Plaintiff. The forms and varieties of constructive 
trusts are practically without limit, such trusts 
being raised, broadly speaking, whenever necessary 
to prevent injustice." 89 CJS Trusts §142, p. 1027. 
Appellant argues that the existence of fraud and deception is a 
mandatory prerequisite to the adoption of a constructive trust. 
"But the impact of the constructive trust is not limited to 
circumstances comprised within the term fraud: 
'A constructive trust is the formula through 
which the conscience of equity finds expression. 
When property has been acquired in such circumstances 
that the holder of the legal title may not in good 
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity 
converts him into a trustee.1 
'A court of equity in decreeing a constructive 
trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The 
-8-
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equity of the transaction must shape the measure 
of relief.' 
'A constructive trust arises where a person who 
holds title to property is subject to an equitable 
duty to convey it to another on the ground that 
he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted 
to retain it." 
Cases on the LAW OF TRUSTS, George G. Bogert and 
Dallin H. Oaks (1967), p. 318. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this concept in a 
number of cases, creating a constructive trust if warranted by 
the facts or denying the same depending on the circumstances. 
In Haws, et al vs. Jensen, 209 P. 2d 229, 116 Utah 
212, an action was brought to impress a trust upon certain real 
property. The Court reviewed the law of constructive trusts 
at pages 216 and 217 quoting with approval from the Restatement 
of the Law of Trusts and Bogert on Trusts and Trustees: 
"Admittedly there is no writing evidencing 
Mrs. Haws1 intention that the property conveyed 
by her be held in trust by Amber. However, under 
certain circumstances existing at the time a 
conveyance in trust is made, no writing evidencing 
an intent to create a trust is required. In those 
instances, equity will impress a constructive trust 
upon the property in favor of the person or persons 
designated by the Grantor as the beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries of the oral trust. A constructive trust, 
being an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrich-
ment, arises by operation of law and is not within 
the statute of frauds *...." 
11
 A Court of equity in decreeing a constructive 
trust, is bound by no unyielding formula, but is 
free to effect justice according to the equities 
peculiar to each transaction wherever a failure 
to perform a duty to convey property would result 
in unjust enrichment." 
See, Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 43; 492 P. 2d 1343. 
-9-
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See also, 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part I, 
1946 Ed., §471 at pages 5 and 6 defining a constructive trust. 
Although not a necessary element in a constructive 
trust, a fiduciary relationship can lend support. See, Scott 
on Trusts, §462.1, pages 3414-3415. In this case, the mutual 
business dealings and transactions of all of the parties in 
connection with the trust fund sustained a confidential and 
fiduciary relation. In fact, the Trustees1 construction of the 
Trust Agreement permitting Kaibab1s participation with J. E. 
Crofts1 knowledge and involvement virtually made Kaibab part 
of the express trust. 
"The Trustee shall have power to construe the 
provisions of this agreement and the terms 
used herein and any construction adopted by 
the Trustees in good faith shall be binding 
upon all the parties hereto." (Emphasis added.) 
Trust Agreement Exhibit, Article V, Section 2. 
For a period of four years, the Trustees operating 
under said Agreement accepted therein the money or property 
of Kaibab and by so doing held the same for the uses and 
purposes of the trust for Kaibab's benefit as provided in 
Trust Agreement Exhibit, Article III, Section 2 thereof: 
"The trustees named in the preceding section of 
this article, by their execution of this agree-
ment and declaration of trust, hereby accept 
the trusteeship and declare that they will 
receive and hold the subscribers1 contributions 
and any other money or property which may come 
into their hands by virtue of this instrument 
as trustees thereunder for the uses, purposes, 
and trusts, and with the powers and duties herein 
set forth and none other." (Emphasis added.) 
-10-
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Kaibab submits that the Trustees and J. E. Crofts 
should be bound by their conduct with Kaibab pursuant to the 
foregoing trust provisions. The Trustees construed said agree-
ment to permit Kaibab's participation therein, insured its 
employees, billed it, accepted its premium payments, and in 
essence, treated it the same as any other subscriber. The 
Trustees should continue a similar course of conduct in making 
distribution of the fund and deliver to Kaibab that portion 
attributable to Kaibab's participation. It would be an abuse 
of the existing confidential and fiduciary business relationship to 
do otherwise. 
Compare, Hawkins vs. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P. 2d 372, 
where a constructive trust was imposed to prevent unjust enrich-
ment in a confidential relationship. 
J. E. Crofts previously received $4,851.72 in dividends 
from the fund, virtual reimbursement of the 1965 fund balance, 
and have had the use and benefit of the same for several years. 
If J. E. Crofts were to receive the current $10,075.55 fund 
balance, it would have full reimbursement of the $7,571.31 
premiums paid since 1965 plus $2,504.25 to boot. This would be 
a 133% return directly on premium payments (emphasis added) made 
by J. E. Crofts, plus four years of insurance coverage on its 
employees at no expense. Would not this unjustly enrich J. E. 
Crofts? If considered a fee or commission for handling 35 of 
Kaibab's premiums, the return would be even more gross. Certainly, 
this is a proper case for restitution of the fund to the parties 
whose payments created it, including Kaibab. 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is noted that when the Restatement of Trusts was 
in preparation, it was decided not to include constructive 
trusts, but to deal with them in a Restatement of Restitution. 
Scott, Constructive Trusts, 71 L. Q. Rev. 39 (1955) . In an 
earlier article, Scott and Seavey discuss the broad scope of 
the constructive trust in making restitution as follows: 
"The broad scope of the constructive trust is 
indicated in the Restatement, which states that 
a constructive trust arises where a person holding 
title to property is subject to an equitable duty 
to convey it to another on the ground that he 
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to 
retain it. The conception of the Restatement is 
that a constructive trust is a remedy created to 
enforce a right of restitution arising out of 
unjust enrichment, and that it arises in every 
case where a benefit consisting of property has 
been received as to which there is a duty to make 
restitution to another. This broad conception 
of the scope of the constructive trust is expressed 
by Mr. Justice Cardozo. He says: 'When property 
has been acquired in such circumstances that the 
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience 
retain the beneficial interest, equity converts 
him into a trustee1. Dean Pound has spoken of the 
use of the constructive trust as affording 'specific 
restitution of a received benefit in order to prevent 
unjust enrichment'; and he has pointed out that the 
constructive trust, unlike the express trust, is a 
remedial and not a substantive institution." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Scott and Seavey, Restitution, 54 L. Q. Rev. 29, 
41 (1938). See also, Scott on Trusts, §462.2 at 
3417, 3418. 
By use of the constructive trust, the lower Court has 
restored each party to the status quo, each receiving that which 
was properly expected at the outset. One can speculate indefinitely 
about what the respective duties and obligations of the parties 
-12-
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would have been, if this event or that had occurred, such as 
mismanagement of the fund by the Trustees, etc. However, no 
such facts are before the Court. Both parties on appeal 
submitted the matter on the basis that there was no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that judgment should be 
rendered as a matter of law. The lower Court entered its 
Judgment on sound legal ground, which Judgment should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED TO 
BE VALID AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THE APPELLANT SUSTAINS 
ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING ERROR. 
After the pleadings were in and discovery completed, 
the parties met with the trial Court in a pretrial conference 
on October 29, 1974. (Letter Exhibit) At the conclusion of 
said conference, it was stipulated that the matter would be 
submitted to the Court for final determination on Defendants' 
joint motions for summary judgment. (R. 136) Thereafter, on 
November 15, 1974, the matter was submitted for final determina-
tion on arguments and memorandums of counsel. (R. 137) There 
is no dispute over the material facts as found by the Court in 
its decision. (R. 134) And formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions for 
summary judgment. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the Court clearly determined that the disputed 
fund was produced as the result of refunds and dividends from 
the payment of insurance premiums by the Defendants and from no 
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other source, that payments were "loaded" and that refunds 
would be in order based on experience, that Kaibab paid 92.2% 
and J. E. Crofts paid 7.8% of the total premium payments, and 
that Kaibab was not a member and J. E. Crofts was a member of 
the U.A.D.A. (R. 134) Thereupon, the Court as a matter of 
law imposed a constructive trust upon the fund entitling 
each Defendant to a proportionate interest based on contribu-
tions thereto. (R. 134) 
The constructive trust has been called "the most 
important contribution of equity to the remedies for the 
prevention of unjust enrichment". See, J. Dawson, Unjust 
Enrichment 26 (1951). Since the judgment herein is founded 
in equity, this Court may review questions of both fact and 
law for the purpose of rectifying errors where the record 
does not support the findings or where it clearly preponderates 
against them. See, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 9. Upon such 
review, the findings and conclusions of the trial Court are 
entitled to a presumption of validity, together with recognition 
that the burden is upon the Appellant to show that they are in 
error. See, Latimer vs. Katz, 29 Utah 2d 280, 283; 508 P. 2d 
542 (1973). 
This doctrine has been expressed by this Court by 
similar language in a variety of equity cases: 
(1) In an action for a decree impressing certain 
realty with a trust and for an accounting and 
other relief, the Court stated, "We will, 
however, not disturb the findings of fact unless 
it appears that the trial judge made findings 
-14-
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against the weight of the evidence." Peterson v. 
Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 138; 190 P. 2d 135. 
(2) In a boundary line case, the Court held, "although 
the question...is a matter of equity, we will 
reverse the trial Court's findings of fact only 
if we conclude that they are clearly erroneous." 
Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 112; 369 P. 2d 
117. 
(3) In a proceeding for settlement of partnership 
accounts, the Court ruled: 
"... we do not disturb his findings and 
judgment merely because we might have viewed 
the matter differently, but would do so only 
if it appeared that the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them, or that he has 
so abused his discretion, or misapplied the 
law, that an injustice has resulted." 
Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 381; 472 
P. 2d 430. 
(4) Many divorce cases enunciate and support these 
principles. See, Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 
380; 431 P. 2d 802 and citations therein. 
(5) In an action to quiet title to realty, the Court 
said: 
"... we review the trial Court's findings 
of fact but overturn them only where it is 
manifest that the trial Court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly against 
the weight of the evidence." Metropolitan 
Investment Company v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 40; 
376 P. 2d 940. 
Where is the clear error which overcomes the presumption 
in favor of the trial court? Where is the injustice in this judg-
ment that must be overturned? Or where is the better judgment 
to be substituted in its stead? We submit that there is none 
to be found herein. And that Appellant has not overcome its 
established burden. 
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CONCLUSION 
The two Defendant corporations (Appellant and 
Respondent herein) have always been separate and distinct 
business entities. The Plaintiff Trustees construed the 
insurance trust agreement to permit Kaibab's participation 
in the group insurance plan. The Trustees and J. E. Crofts, 
a subscriber, both participated actively in the arrangement, 
soliciting Kaibab1s insurance business. J. E. Crofts acted 
as a conduit for some of Kaibab's premium payments. For four 
years the Trustees insured Kaibabfs employees and Kaibab paid 
the Trustees $89,729.27 in premiums. Neither J. E. Crofts or 
its shareholders employed Kaibab's personnel or paid their 
insurance premiums. On its few employees, J. E. Crofts did 
pay $7,571.31 in premiums. 
As in any such group insurance plan to which the 
parties could subscribe, these premiums were "loaded" and 
dividends and refunds payable based on the experience of the 
carrier. During the time the fund was created, Kaibab paid 
92.2% and J. E. Crofts paid 7.8% of the total premium payments. 
J. E. Crofts claims the entire fund thus created. Kaibab claims 
that each party should have its pro rata share. 
J. E. Crofts is in the anomalous position of approving 
and participating in Kaibab's payment of premiums creating 
the trust fund, but when dividends and refunds are to be paid 
out of the fund, it insists that Kaibab receive nothing and it 
receive everything! This would amount to a 133% return on J. E. 
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Crofts1 premiums. Can equity and good conscience permit such 
enrichment to J. E. Crofts and corresponding detriment to Kaibab? 
We submit that the remedial device of a constructive 
trust to prevent or redress this unjust enrichment and make 
restitution should prevail in this case and distribution of the 
trust fund made proportionately to each of the parties in 
accordance with the Judgment of the Lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NORMAN H. JACKSON 
Mattsson, Jackson & Mclff 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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